Do terrorist attacks affect Kenya's financial markets? by Kigen, Dan Kiprono
 
 
 
Do terrorist attacks affect Kenya’s financial markets? 
 By  
Dan Kiprono Kigen 
Student Number: 1242812 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Masters of Management in Finance and Investment (MMFI) 
in the 
FACULTY OF COMMERCE, LAW AND MANAGEMENT 
WITS BUSINESS SCHOOL 
At the 
UNIVERSITY OF WITWATERSRAND 
 
2 
 
Declaration 
I, Dan Kiprono Kigen, declare that the research work reported in this dissertation is my own, 
except where otherwise indicated and acknowledged. It is submitted for the degree of Master of 
Management in Finance & Investment in the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. This 
thesis has not, either in whole or in part, been submitted for a degree or diploma to any other 
universities. 
 
Signed………………………………………………………Date: 29th  August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis studied the effects of terrorist attacks on Kenya‟s financial markets between January 
2004 and December 2014. The study uses an augmented asset-pricing model similar to that in 
Eldor and Menelik (2004). The model includes terrorist attack dummies representing location of 
the attack, the type of attack, the intended target, number of people injured and number of people 
killed. Data on the terrorist attacks and share index values and foreign exchange rates variables 
are used to estimate the model.  
The results show that attacks carried out using explosives had a positive impact on share prices 
on the NSE. On the flipside, attacks that were carried out on facilities/infrastructure or on 
religious figures/institutions as well as those carried out using incendiaries had a negative impact 
on the NSE. An increase in the number of people injured also led to a greater negative impact on 
the NSE. As regards the forex market, attacks carried out using firearms and incendiaries led to a 
depreciation of the local currency. Transport attacks on the other hand led to an appreciation. 
Similarly, the greater the number of people injured led to a greater appreciation of the KES. 
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3. INTRODUCTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
One of the major problems facing many countries in the 21
st
 century is terrorism. Terrorism, has 
been defined as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate 
or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives" (Legal Information Institute, 1969).Terror attacks happen almost 
on a daily basis worldwide, many of them causing loss of lives and catastrophic damage. In the 
month of November 2015 for instance, terror attacks took place in the form of suicide bombings 
in Baghdad, Iraq (VOA, 2015) and Arsal, Lebanon (English.alarabiya.net, 2015); and in the form 
of shootings in Colorado, US (Shapiro, 2015) and Paris, France (Almasy, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Chart showing the rise in global fatalities because of terrorism (Source: Global 
Terrorism Database) 
 
Closer home, Africa has also had its share of terrorist attacks. On November 20 2015, Islamic 
militants affiliated to Al-Mourabitoun and Al-Qaeda carried out shootings in Bamako, Mali that 
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claimed 30 lives (the Guardian, 2015a). Earlier on in the year, on April 1 2015, several Al-
Shabaab militants shot their way into a University college in the town of Garissa, the capital of 
Garissa County, in North Eastern Kenya. The attack resulted in the loss of 148 students‟ lives 
(BBC News, 2015a).These incidents demonstrate that terrorism is a global problem that is 
widespread and affects several countries in all continents across the globe. This is seen in Figure 
1, which shows a rise in global terror attacks since 2000. 
 
3.2 Motivation 
 
Kenya has had a large number of terrorist attacks through its history. These attacks have had 
various political and social objectives. The citizens have suffered and the ever-increasing 
terrorist attacks have added to the pre-existing high rate of crime and insecurity within the 
country. 
The first major set of attacks was the 1975 bombings. The first bomb was set off in a restroom of 
a popular club called „The Starlight‟ in Nairobi‟s Central Business District while the second one 
went off at a Tourist Information Centre adjacent to the Hilton Hotel in Nairobi. The third and 
final bomb was set off in a Mombasa-bound bus at the crowded OTC Bus terminus on Ronald 
Ngala Street, also in Nairobi. The third bombing was extremely tragic with 27 killed and at 
least100 injured. The attacks were allegedly attempts to assassinate politician, J.M. Kariuki, an 
assistant minister and strong critic of the government. He was later found dead and the bombings 
ceased. His killers and the bombers were not brought to justice (Too Late for Worms, 2014). 
In 1980, a bombing took place at the prestigious Norfolk Hotel on Harry Thuku Road in Central 
Nairobi. 20 people were killed and 80 injured. The attack was claimed to have been orchestrated 
by a Palestinian organization, the Peoples Front for the Liberalization of Palestine (PFLP). The 
possible motives were speculated as retaliation of Kenya arresting 3 Palestinians and 2 German 
nationals and allowing the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to refuel at Jomo Kenyatta International 
Airport (JKIA) before an attempt to rescue Israeli hostages from a civilian aircraft at Entebbe 
International Airport, in Uganda. The group however denied involvement (Mobile.nation.co.ke, 
2015; Yahoo News, 2015b). 
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On August 7, 1998, the United States Embassy in Nairobi was subject to a bombing that claimed 
224 lives. Al-Qaeda militants drove a small truck carrying 900kg worth of explosives into the 
parking garage at the building housing the Embassy at approximately 10am 
(Africaanswerman.com, 2010). This was considered a precursor to the infamous 9/11 terrorist 
attacks that were also aimed at United States interests. The motivation for the attack was that 
Americans had assisted in the extradition of four members of a jihadist group from Albania to 
their hometown of Egypt. The extradited suspects allegedly assassinated the former speaker of 
the Egyptian parliament (Mayer, 2008). 
On November 28, 2002, a militant group called „Army of Palestine‟ launched ground-to-air 
missiles at an Israeli plane in the coastal town of Mombasa. At the same time, an all-terrain-
vehicle was driven into the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel, also located in Mombasa. 13 people 
lost their lives and 80 more were injured (News.bbc.co.uk, 2002). 
In October 2011, Kenya launched a military offensive in Somalia nicknamed „Operation Linda 
Nchi‟. This was a joint operation with the Somali military. The main objective was to pursue Al-
Shabaab militants who had claimed responsibility for a spate of kidnappings of foreign tourists in 
Kenya between 2011 and 2012 (Gettleman, 2011). During this period, there were at least 17 
terrorist attacks carried out through grenades and other types of explosives. At least 48 people 
lost their lives and around 200 were injured. 4 of these attacks took place in Nairobi, 4 took place 
in Mombasa and the remaining 9 took place in the country‟s North Eastern province. The targets 
included buses, churches and nightclubs (Nairobi.usembassy.gov, 2015). 
One of the deadliest attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab took place on 21 September 2013, 
leading to the death of at least 67 people. At around midday, 10-15 gunmen entered the upmarket 
Westgate Mall in Nairobi and opened fire on unarmed civilians. The resulting siege by the 
country‟s Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) lasted 3 days. In the end, it was unclear whether the 
gunmen escaped or perished (BBC News, 2015c). 
On December 2, 2014, Al-Shabaab militants killed 36 non-Muslim quarry workers in the town of 
Mandera, in the Northern part of Kenya. The attacks took place at midnight when workers were 
asleep (BBC News, 2015d). Another attack perpetrated by Al-Shabaab took place on November 
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22, 2014: at least 28 people were killed by gunmen who shot up a Nairobi bound bus. Non-
Muslims were specifically targeted and executed (Euronews, 2015). 
 
Variable  Total No. of Attacks 
Attack Type Assassination 21 
 Armed & Unarmed Assault 148 
 Bombing/Explosion 153 
 Hijacking& Hostage Taking  29 
 Facility/Infrastructure 10 
 Unknown 7 
Target Type Business 51 
 Government (General)  152 
 Other 40 
 Private Citizens 75 
 Religious Figures/Institutions 32 
 Transportation/ Communication 18 
Weapon Type Firearms 145 
 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 175 
 Incendiary 15 
 Melee 15 
 Other 18 
Fatalities Unknown 7 
 0  162 
 1 – 10 180 
 11 – 50 17 
 51 – 100 1 
 101 and above 1 
Injuries Unknown 21 
 0  167 
 1 – 10 150 
 11 – 50 26 
 51 – 100 1 
 101 and above 3 
Location Cities* 84 
 Other  284 
Perpetrator Al-Shabaab 201 
 Other 167 
   
 Total Injuries 5503 
 Total Fatalities 1140 
 No. of Attacks 368 
   
Table 1: Summary of terrorist attacks in Kenya from 1995 to 2014 
 
 
 
14 
 
   
Variable  Killed* Injured* 
Attack Type Assassination 1.43 0.70 
 Armed & Unarmed Assault 3.49 1.83 
 Bombing/Explosion 2.51 32.07 
 Hijacking& Hostage Taking  8.12 11.74 
 Facility/Infrastructure 0.20 0.56 
 Unknown 1.83 11.4 
Target Type Business 2.92 7.86 
 Government (General)  3.13 29.19 
 Other 2.10 2.70 
 Private Citizens 3.79 5.52 
 Religious Figures/Institutions 3.81 4.32 
 Transportation/ Communication 2.67 17.29 
Weapon Type Firearms 3.55 1.14 
 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 2.96 30.06 
 Incendiary 5.13 0.62 
 Melee 1.53 3.27 
 Other 1.33 5.64 
Location Cities 5.25 60.86 
 Other  2.53 2.37 
Perpetrator Al-Shabaab 2.58 5.60 
 Other 3.83 27.99 
*The cities are Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu 
 
Table 2: Proportion of people killed and injured by attack categories 
* Proportion of people killed and injured by attack is calculated by dividing the total number of 
people killed or injured in that particular type of attack by the number of attacks that occurred 
 
On June 15, 2014, 48 people lost their lives when around 50 Al-Shabaab gunmen stormed into 
the town of Mpeketoni located near Lamu. They first attacked a police station and then shot up 
several civilians watching the 2014 world cup matches in local clubs (BBC News, 2015e). 
As can be seen in table 1, Kenya has been plagued by many terrorist attacks that have taken 
various forms and have occurred in different locations across the country. This can be seen in the 
chart above. On 21 September 2013, Al-Shabaab gunmen carried out a shooting in Nairobi‟s up 
market Westgate shopping mall. Over 80 people lost their lives. Key to note is that the Nairobi 
Securities All Share Index (NASI) recorded a 0.32% decline while the Nairobi Securities 20 
Share Index (NSE20) dropped by 0.26% on the Monday following Westgate attack (Figure 2). 
As for the Garissa College University massacre, the NASI dropped by 1.29% while the NSE 20 
declined by 0.33% when the markets opened (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Yield on the NSE and the USD/KES Exchange Rate after significant attacks (Obtained 
from Global Terrorism Database) 
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Figure 3: Fatalities from various types of terror attacks during1998 – 2013 (Source:  Global 
Terrorism Database) 
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Figure 4: Statistics on terrorist attacks from 1995 to 2014(Source:  Global Terrorism Database) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:NSE20 Share Index History 
 
3.3 Problem statement 
 
Terrorism arguably affects the economy of a country. The Nairobi Securities Exchange is among 
the fastest growing exchanges in Africa with a total 3-year return of 97.8% as at 30 April 
2015(Investing in Africa, 2015). Paramount to this growth is investment from foreign investors. 
This number stood at 22.4% as at September 2014, as per the latest filings from the Capital 
Markets Authority (Capital Markets Authority, 2015). Anecdotal evidence shows (see Figure 2) 
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shows that terrorist attacks have an effect on the performance of the stock market. It is not clear, 
however, if such effects are significant or the extent to which they affect investors‟ positions. It 
is thus important to establish exactly how recent attacks have affected the financial markets. 
Such knowledge will be beneficial to local and foreign investors who can use it to plan their 
investment responses to terrorist attacks. This research also investigates the effect of terrorist 
attacks on the performance of the foreign exchange market.  
This paper carried out further on the effects of terrorism on African financial markets. The paper 
in particular, furthered the work done by Keitany & Lumumba (2013) who studied the effects of 
terrorism on the Kenyan market and used an event study methodology. The study found that 
significant short-term negative returns were present post-terrorist attacks. However, their study is 
deficient in that he only observed 3 events. In empirical design, this study was an improvement 
on Keitany & Lumumba (2013), because more events were observed and additionally an asset-
pricing model was estimated. The study followed Eldor and Melnik (2004) who used an asset-
pricing test to study the effects the type of target, type of attack, number of people killed and the 
location of the attack on both equity and currency returns on the Israeli stock market. The results 
of this study thus enabled a direct comparison between effects of terrorism in a young market 
with similar results in an emerging market (Israel) and, by extension, more developed markets. 
 
3.4 Purpose of the study 
 
This paper aimed to build on existing literature on the damaging effects on terrorism on a 
country‟s economy. Acts of terrorism are despicable acts that lead to loss of human life and 
while the economic effects obviously come secondary to this, they nonetheless need to be 
studied.  
Critics of the Kenya government say that more needs to be invested to combat terrorism 
(Wangalwa, 2015). By presenting facts and figures on the effects of terrorism on Kenya‟s 
financial markets, the paper hopes to make the Kenyan government aware on how damaging 
terrorism is on several aspects of the Kenyan economy. Additionally, by understanding the 
effects of different types of terror attacks, the government will be able to formulate effective 
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policies to counter the economic and financial repercussions of terrorist attacks. As a result, the 
Capital Markets Authority (CMA, Kenya‟s financial markets regulatory agency) will also be 
more effective in its day-today governing the financial markets. 
Another significant purpose of this study is to assist asset managers to protect their clients‟ assets 
against the financial impacts of terrorist attacks. By knowing the extent to which their portfolios 
react to different types of attacks, they are better placed to manage risk against future similar 
attacks by selecting the right assets to form properly hedged portfolios. They will also be able to 
pick the right terrorist insurance covers to further safeguard their portfolios. 
Corporations with global operations also need to know the extent of terrorist attacks on their 
operations in frontier markets with high incidences of terrorism. The investors of these firms also 
need to know the effect of the terror attacks. 
The results of the study will also on a larger scale assist in the comparison of frontier and 
emerging markets to more developed markets. This is essential because as previously mentioned; 
terrorism is a problem that affects many countries and a comparative understanding of its effects 
across developed and developing financial markets is useful for international portfolio 
diversification.  
 
3.5 Objectives of the Study 
 
In my attempt to successfully carry out this study, I hope to fulfill the following objectives: - 
a. Determine the effect of terrorist attacks on stock and currency markets in Kenya. 
b. Compare the effects of terrorism in Kenya‟s nascent financial markets to more developed 
financial markets e.g. Israel 
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3.6 Outline of the Report 
 
The report has the following outline: - 
i. Introduction 
ii. Thematic Literature & Current Situation 
iii. Research Methodology 
iv. Analysis & Result 
v. Conclusions and Recommendations 
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This section will carry out an extensive review of previous studies carried out on the effects of 
terrorism on financial markets and draw lessons from those studies. The research gap that is 
expected to be filled will also be discussed. 
 
4.2 Previous Studies of Terrorism in Kenya& Globally 
 
Global financial markets today are highly interconnected. Most trades are conducted online and 
assets change hands at the simple click of a button. An event that occurs in one part of the globe 
can thus have a rippling effect on financial markets on the other side of the globe.   This was 
seen in the 2008 financial crisis whereby all financial markets registered a slump following the 
collages of the US global markets. Furthermore, the larger countries have a much a larger effect 
on the smaller ones primarily due to the number of trading partners involved. Larger countries 
are less dependent on the smaller ones as compared to vice versa. Given this observation, 
Khumar and Liu (2013) studied the effects of terrorist attacks on various global markets. They 
concluded that larger economies create a greater spillover effect to smaller economies as 
compared to small economies that had a lesser spillover effect on larger ones. Additionally, large 
economies with large trading partners do not experience spillover effects to their financial 
markets. According to the study, “odds for smaller trading partners experiencing a negative 
abnormal stock return are 5.7 times greater”. (Kumar & Liu, 2013) 
Chesney, Reshetar Karaman (2011) studied the effects of terrorism not only on the stock 
markets, but also on the commodity and bond markets. The study used daily data from 25 
countries over an 11-year period and employed three methodological approaches: GARCH-EVT, 
event study and non-parametric approaches. The results showed that terrorist attacks had a 
significant effect on global stock markets. The oil and gas, airline, financial and banking and 
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insurance sectors were tested. The insurance and airline industries were the most sensitive to 
terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the banking sector was the least sensitive. The underlying 
reason was that the insurance sector experienced increases in the number of claims. As for the 
banking sector, it was least affected due to a large bulk of revenue being obtained from banking 
operations (e.g. transaction costs), which are constant throughout. As regards the bonds and 
commodity markets, they found both significant positive and negative reactions to terrorist 
attacks. Another finding was that the US bond markets reacted to events occurring on the event 
day while others such as the gold markets the reaction was post event. As for other markets such 
as commodities, stocks, global and European bonds, they react both during and the event day and 
post event (Chesney, Reshetar Karaman, 2011). 
Arin, Ciferri and Spagnolo (2008) investigated the effects of terrorism on stock market returns 
and volatility in6 countries; Indonesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and United Kingdom. 
They concluded that stock markets in Europe are generally the least affected by terrorist attacks. 
Although the European countries studied have had quite a number of terrorist attacks (i.e. Spain 
and Turkey), these attacks are still fewer in number as compared to those in other markets (i.e. 
Indonesia and Israel). It would thus be argued that the few attacks that do take place should have 
a greater impact due to their infrequent occurrence. Going by this same trail of thought, countries 
such as Israel (Israel-Palestine conflict) on the other hand would be expected to have a smaller 
impact to attacks due to reduced sensitivity as a result of them taking place more frequently. The 
actual case however, may be that the European financial markets may view the attacks as one-off 
incidents while the countries such as Israel, and perhaps Kenya, where terror attacks are 
commonplace would have long impounded the possibility of such attacks in their financial asset 
prices. Any (small) effects of such attacks on the financial markets might therefore be 
insignificant and would be reversed quickly as was seen the case for US financial markets post 
9/11 (NedelescuandJohnston, 2005).However, the more advanced European financial markets 
may have safeguards such as terrorism cover and derivatives such as options which shield 
investors from losses that might cause such attacks not to significantly affect the financial 
markets. 
Johnston &Nedelescu (2005) also studied the ways in which financial markets react to the news 
of terror attacks. The paper also studied the ways in which governments react to them. The study 
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concluded that there were both direct and indirect costs associated with terrorism. Direct costs 
included loss of lives and destruction of property. Indirect costs included the loss of both 
consumer and investor confidence.  
Direct costs can be measured while the number of lives can also be determined but obviously not 
to be looked at from a financial standpoint. For property however, damaged property can be 
appraised based on market values. Key to note is that this is mostly in the short term. As for the 
indirect costs, these can be somewhat difficult to determine. This means that they can be hard to 
measure outright and may have a longer unseen impact. For example, an investor who had a 
portfolio heavily weighted with US insurance stocks may be wary of investing again in the 
market if they lost huge sums of money as a result of terrorist attacks. 
The paper analyzed 2 major terrorist attack events, the infamous 9/11 New York terror attacks 
that took place on September 11
th
2001 and the Madrid bombings which took place on March 11
th
 
2004.The paper studied the returns on the Standard &Poors (S&P) 500index and the Dow Jones 
Euro Stock Index. The results also showed that the markets were highly efficient and absorbed 
the effects of the terrorist attacks in the end (Nedelescu& Johnston, 2005). 
These results mirror those of the study carried out by Arin, Ciferri and Spagnolo (2008) who 
determined that developed financial markets (i.e. Spain and United Kingdom) are less affected 
by terrorist attacks. Enders & Sandler, (n.d.), performed a study and came to the conclusion that 
the effects of terrorist attacks are short term in nature and the recovery is usually quick, even 
from large scale attacks. Larger economies with more well developed financial systems generally 
recover quicker. The study also found that developed economies are able to offset the impacts of 
attacks through both monetary and fiscal policies (Enders& Sandler, n.d.). 
In their paper, Kollias et al (2010) studied the effects of terrorist attacks on the London Stock 
Exchange (large market cap) and the Athens Stock Exchange (small market cap). An event study 
conditional volatility model was used. It was discovered that they both negatively react to attacks 
and the level of impact does not change over time. They both also react more significantly to 
larger attacks. They are however affected by the magnitude of the attacks as regards the 
significant political implications of the attack (Kollias et al 2010). 
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The fact that both markets react negatively to attacks was expected. Additionally, the level of 
impact did not change over time. This was also expected since attacks are infrequent in nature. If 
the attacks were more in number, desensitization would most likely occur in the markets. 
Additionally, the fact that the larger attacks are more greatly affected by terrorist attacks is the 
convention. Other studies such as Eldor and Melnick (2004) mirror this result. 
Eldor, Hauser, Kroll &Shoukair (2002) studied the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on 
both Palestine‟s and Israel‟s financial markets. It was discovered that during the Intifada 
uprisings, both stock markets were severely affected.  
These were 2 periods of intense Palestine and Israel violence. The first intifada took place from 
1987 to 1993. An Israeli truck driver who lost control and smashed into a car containing four 
Palestinians (Sachar, 2015) caused it. The second intifada took place from 2000 to 2005. It was 
sparked a visit from the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon to a mosque in Jerusalem‟s old city. 
This was seen as a provocation. The resulting attacks were very large in magnitude (User, 2015). 
As has been seen in other studies, the attacks led to negative returns in the stock markets. 
However, during other periods, the Israeli markets suffered much more than the Palestinian 
markets. It was also found that the greater the casualties, the greater the negative impact (Eldor, 
Hauser, Kroll &Shoukair, 2012). 
One factor that may contribute to the Israeli market suffering largely is that Palestine has a 
greater occurrence of terrorist attacks. There are even extreme contingency plans that have been 
put in place in case the exchange itself is attacked. For example, there are no trading floors and 
in the event of an actual attack, the exchange can be fully run in another remote location (Topol, 
2011). 
Gul et al (2010) studied the impacts of terrorism on Pakistani‟s financial markets. This was done 
by studying the effects over a 2-year period from 2006 to 2008. An ordinary least squares 
method was used to analyze the daily data of the stock exchange, forex and interbank markets. It 
was discovered that the stock exchange was much more sensitive than the Forex and Interbank 
markets, where the impact was insignificant. The forex market was expected to be more volatile 
than the stock market but most likely, it did not react significantly due to intervention by the 
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The dip in the interbank market rates, albeit small, may have been 
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due to decreased short term lending since attacks have a negative effect on investment (Gul et al 
2010). 
Bashir, InamUlHaq Gillani (2013) also studied the effects of terrorist attacks on the Karachi 
stock exchange with daily yields from 2005 to 2010 and using the GARCH and GARCH-EVT 
approaches. As was expected, the main conclusion was that terrorist attacks were highly 
significant and led to lower returns (Bashir, InamUlHaq & Gillani, 2013).Pakistan has one of the 
highest incidences of terrorist attacks and this has grown worse in recent years. In 2003, there 
were 164 fatalities from terror attacks. This number rose to 3318 in 2009. This is attributed to the 
sectarian/religious violence between the Shia and Sunni Muslim groups (Peacekashmir.org, 
2015). Despite the violence and terrorist attacks, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is one of the 
best performing exchanges in the world with equities registering a 26% annual return from 2009 
till 2014 (The Express Tribune, 2015).  
Cam (2007) studied the stock market efficiency as regards tenant firms on the World Trade 
Centre (WTC), the industry specific effects of different terrorist attacks and the effects of 
different local and foreign attacks on the US equity markets. It was found that there was a greater 
negative impact on tenant firms on the WTC and that different industries react to attacks 
differently. Some industries are more sensitive to attacks than others (Cam, 2007). 
The fact that tenant firms on the WTC experienced a greater negative impact may point to the 
fact that some firm‟s headquarters were located in the building. Loss of key staff and 
administrative information may lead to significant problems in operation. Even if data backups 
were present, restoring the systems may prove problematic. The fact that some industries are 
more sensitive to terror attacks has already been proven (as stated earlier) by Chesney, Reshetar 
and Karaman (2011). 
Tavor (2011) sought to find out the effects of terror attacks on the Israeli stock market. The first 
finding was that attacks do have a negative impact on the stock market. More specifically, the 
market has a significant negative reaction to events within the greenline and less to events 
outside it. The green line refers to a line that separates Israel from its Arab neighbours following 
the 1984 war of independence (Haaretz.com, 2015).  Key to note is that the area outside is in 
constant disarray. Another finding was that for attacks within the greenline, location was 
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significant. Four areas within Israel were studied. These areas were Jerusalem, the Northern, 
Central and Southern district. The greatest impact was by attacks in the Central and Jerusalem, 
the major economic areas. These results are particularly interesting because this studying the 
effects per location will also be applied to this study. As will be seen later, attacks in the cities of 
Kenya (Nairobi, Mombasa & Kisumu) will be compared to attacks that take place in other 
locations. The effect of number of fatalities as well will also be looked at in this study.  
Another finding was that attacks with fatalities had a greater negative abnormal return as 
compared to those without. Attacks that had a response by the Israeli Defense force (IDF) had a 
smaller negative abnormal return over successive days. This is when compared to those without 
(Tavor, 2011). This would most likely imply that the market views this as a representation of 
concern by authorities and chances of better security and responses in future. 
Christofis et al (2010) studied the effects of the Istanbul terrorist attacks on the Istanbul stock 
market. These attacks took place in the years 1999, 2003 and 2008. An asset-pricing model was 
used to assess the data. It was discovered that stocks for the tourism sector were the most 
sensitive to attacks (Christofis et al, 2010). 
In a study by Fathi and Shahraki (2011), they observed the effects of terrorist attacks on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. The data was analyzed using a compare the means method. The results 
showed that attacks had a significant negative impact. This is in contrast to the results of this 
study. A comparison can be made ideally because the Tehran stock exchange is also a frontier 
market. In this study, we observe that some attack types had a positive impact while others had a 
negative impact. 
In a paper by Jhandir (2014), the study concluded that terrorism leads to currency depreciation 
and negative abnormal returns on the Pakistan Stock market. Monthly data over a 10-yearperiod 
from 2003 to 2012 was analyzed using the ordinary least squares method and a correlation 
analysis was done (Jhandir, 2014).The results were as expected since it has already been proven 
with other studies that terrorist attacks lead to a depreciation of the currency. Key to note, 
according to the 2014 Global Terrorism Index Report (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014), 
Pakistan was the third most affected country as regards terrorist attacks. In 2013 & 2014, the 
Pakistan rupee was also Asia‟s best performing currency over the previous 2-year period. 
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Suleman (n.d.) also studied Pakistan‟s financial markets but focused on Karachi. He intended to 
find the effect of global terrorist attacks on other international stock markets. He found that 
global terrorist attacks (e.g. 9/11 attacks) increased volatility in Karachi‟s financial markets. 
Eldor and Melnick (2004) also studied how Israel‟s stock and foreign exchange markets react to 
terror. They however went further and broke down their study into number of people killed, 
number of attacks per day, location and target. They concluded that the effects of a suicide 
attacks are permanent while the other types are not. Similarly, they also found out that attacks on 
transport are transitory while those of the other types
1
 are not. As regards location, this does not 
have an effect. The number of people killed, however, has a permanent effect. The number of 
attacks is transitory. More so, it was found that the markets are efficient and do not become 
desensitized. Another finding was that economic policies are not affected by terrorist attacks 
(Eldor and Melnick, 2004). The results of this study are very paramount since the model used in 
this paper was based off the one used in this study.  
Karolyi (2006) attempted to summarize studies that have been carried out on terrorism. He was 
of the view that models that have been used to assess the effects of terrorism have had various 
limitations and have used limited data to make conclusions. The study also concluded that most 
of the research that has been studied has mostly focused the 9/11 attacks, at the expense of other 
attacks (Karolyi, 2006).The results of this study mirror that of Khumar& Liu (2013) where they 
concluded that terrorist attacks in larger economies create a greater spillover effect on smaller 
ones as compared to vice versa. This means that investors should keep track of attacks that take 
place in other countries. This is especially true for large trading partners, in order to safeguard 
their portfolios from attacks. 
Kinyanjui (2014) studied the effects of terrorist attacks on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Kenya. The study employed the use of a multiple regression model. The results showed that 
attacks led to a decrease in FDI. The study also discovered that political stability is the greatest 
factor affecting FDI (Kinyanjui, 2014). 
The results effectively prove that terrorism is damaging to Kenya‟s economy. Similarly, as 
regards foreign inflows, one major sector that has really suffered is the country‟s tourism sector. 
                                                             
1 Cold weapon,  
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Travel advisories issued by western nations have led to a huge decrease in tourist numbers. For 
example, in the January to May period of 2015, numbers dropped to 284,313 as compared to 
381,278 in the same period last year (Businessdailyafrica.com, 2015c). This is worrying 
considering in 2014, tourism contributed to 11% of the country‟s GDP (CNBCAfrica.com, 
2015). Furthermore, the sector is not expected to recover until 2018. The negative impacts of 
attacks will most likely spillover until into 2016 while 2017 will be an election year. Historically 
there have been low bookings during the election years (Morris, 2015).  
Keitany & Lumumba (2013) studied the effects of local terrorist attacks on the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange.  In particular, he studied three events. These were the 1998 US Embassy bombing, the 
2002 Paradise Hotel Bombing and the 2011 tourist kidnappings using an event study 
methodology. The study discovered that there was significant short-term negative returns post 
terrorist attacks (Keitany & Lumumba, 2013). 
This is effectively the only terrorism study that has been done as regards the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange. The study however only looked at three major events and this may not be enough to 
reach valid conclusions. This study on the other hand will observe 284 terrorist attacks over a 10 
year, 2777 trading-day period. These results will hence be more robust. 
Sifunjo et al (2008) studied the efficiency of the foreign exchange market in Kenya. The study 
examined the daily closing price of the KES to the USD over a 13-year period from 1994 to 
2007. Run tests, root tests and the Ljung Box Q statistic was carried out. The study concluded 
that the markets were not efficient according to the Fama French hypothesis. There were 
seasonal patterns existent, (e.g. end of week, end of month), non-stationarity and the presence of 
autocorrelation in returns (Sifunjo et al, 2008).   
The fact that there is reduced efficiency in Kenya‟s foreign exchange markets may bring into 
question the supposed impacts of terrorist attacks on them. Movements may be chalked up to 
inefficiencies already present within the market. 
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4.3 The Research Gap/Summary of the Literature Review 
 
As can be seen, few studies have been carried out on the effects of terrorist attacks on African 
financial markets. Thus, more research needs to be carried out to have a better understanding of 
financial markets reaction to terrorist attacks as well as to actively compare the effects with other 
global attacks. 
As regards the effects of terrorist attacks on Kenya, there is need to delve further on the specific 
aspects of the attacks. Furthermore, only the effects on the stock market have been analyzed.  
This study went further and analyzed the effects on the forex markets. Additionally, a different 
more accurate methodology will be used. 
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section, the methodologies used in this study will be highlighted. The hypothesis will be 
discussed, as well as the process used in the research design and modeling.  
 
5.2 Research Design 
 
The study was descriptive in nature in that it will seek to document the effects of terrorist attacks 
on Kenya‟s forex and stock markets. Secondary data from various sources will be utilized. 
 
5.3 Data Description & Sources 
 
The data was obtained from the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Bloomberg terminal and the 
Global terrorism database
2
. Stock prices and exchange rates were obtained directly from the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange or the Bloomberg terminal. The data on interest rates was also 
obtained from Bloomberg. As regards the attacks, the statistics were obtained from the Global 
terrorism database. 
 
Data Type Source(s) 
Terrorism Data Global Terrorism Database 
NSE 20 Share Index Bloomberg 
MSCI Frontier Markets Africa Index ex SA Bloomberg 
Central Bank Rate (CBR)  Kenya Central Bank Website 
91 Day T-Bill Kenya Kenya Central Bank Website 
                                                             
2
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism 
Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
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91 Day T-Bill US Bloomberg 
USD Exchange Rate Kenya Central Bank Website 
 
Table 3: Summary of information sources 
 
5.4 The Hypothesis 
 
The null hypothesis was that terrorist attacks in Kenya have no effect on returns of listed stocks 
and the domestic currency. The alternative hypothesis was that terrorist attacks in Kenya affect 
stock and currency performance. 
 
5.5 Data Analysis 
 
The data was analyzed using Gretl
3
 software. This is an open source statistical package used for 
analyzing data. Gretl was chosen primarily because it is relatively easy to use and it has a large 
variety of features. Any secondary analysis to be done was achieved with Microsoft Excel. 
The research model used was a multiple regression analysis model with dummy variables. 
Multiple regression analysis refers to a regression model that uses a variety of factors to predict 
the value of a variable (Finance and Development | F&D, 2015).As for a dummy variable, „it is a 
numeric stand-in for a qualitative fact or a logical proposition‟ (Garavaglia& Sharma, n.d.). They 
take values of 0 or 1. In our case, 1 could signify an attack within a major city while an attack 
taking place outside the city with 0. 
The basic research model used was a terrorist‟s dummy-augmented asset pricing model. 
The research also followed the methods of Eldor and Melnick (2004): 
𝑥𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑓𝑡 +  𝛾𝑇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡         
                                                             
 
3 Gnu Regression, Econometrics and Time Series Library 
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𝑥𝑡  – NSE 20 Share Index returns and KES/USD Exchange Rate returns  
α   – Constant  
𝛽  – The vector of factor loading 
𝑓𝑡   – The vector of factors affecting stock market prices and the foreign exchange rate (i.e. MSCI 
Africa Frontier Market Return for the NSE& Interest Rate Differential for the ERY) 
𝛾  – The effect of terrorist attack on the price of interest (stocks or currency); 
𝑇𝑡– The dummy variable for the attack, takes the value1 or 0 
et– Error value 
N/B: The null hypothesis is that 𝛾 = 0while the alternative hypothesis is that 𝛾 ≠ 0 
 
As regards the share prices, the model postulates a strong relationship between returns on the 
NSE 20 Share Index and returns on the MSCI
4
 Frontier markets Index in which movements in 
the MSCI Frontier Index explains the NSE 20-share index movements. Figure 6 shows that there 
is a clear temporal relationship between the two indices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Chart Showing the History of the NSE 20 Share Index and the MSCI Frontier Markets 
Africa Index 
                                                             
4
MSCI stands for ‘Morgan Stanley Capital International’. It is an investment research firm known for its reliable 
indices. https://www.msci.com/our-story 
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The NSE 20 share index is a long-standing price weighted index used to represent the overall 
movement of the NSE. Waithaka (2013) studied the effectiveness of the NSE 20 Share Index and 
the Nairobi Securities Exchange All Share Index (NASI) in representing the market performance 
of companies listed on the NSE. The NSE 20 Share index had a higher correlation of 0.861 to 
market performance of the listed companies (Measured using the monthly ROE)as compared to 
the NASI which had a correlation of 0.822(Waithaka, 2013). 
The MSCI Emerging Frontier Markets is a large and mid-capitalization free float-adjusted index 
composed of 35 companies from 5 frontier markets (i.e. Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and 
Tunisia). This index is highly representative of the NSE 20 Share index and contains the shares 
of three large cap Kenyan companies: Safaricom (largest market cap on the NSE), Kenya 
Commercial Bank and East African Breweries Limited. The index has a yield correlation of 
0.103 with the NSE as can be seen in table 4. 
 
  Price - 
NSE 20 
Price - MSCI FM 
Africa 
Price - MSCI 
Emerging 
Price - MSCI 
World 
Price - NSE 20 1    
Price - MSCI FM Africa 0.8171 1   
Price - MSCI Emerging 0.6395 0.6715 1  
Price - MSCI World 0.8378 0.8190 0.6524 1 
Table 4: Correlation of the price between different Indices 
 
  Yield - 
NSE 20 
Yield - MSCI FM 
Africa 
Yield - MSCI 
Emerging 
Yield - MSCI 
World 
Yield - NSE 20 1    
Yield - MSCI FM Africa 0.1031 1   
Yield - MSCI Emerging 0.0766 0.0394 1  
Yield - MSCI World 0.04320 0.0135 0.7302 1 
Table5: Correlation of the yield between different Indices 
 
As regards the foreign exchange yield, the model postulates that there is a linear relationship 
between the yield on the exchange rate and the interest rate differential (spread between foreign 
rates and the local rates). This argument is rooted in the interest rate parity principle. This is the 
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view that the return of similar assets in different markets is the same after the effect of the 
currency denomination is removed (Levich, 2011).  
The interest rate yield will be calculated by obtaining the difference between the daily yields on a 
91-day US T-bill and that of a similar 91-day Kenyan T-bill. The US dollar currency was 
selected for use in the model because it is the basis for most international trade in the world and 
is as viewed as being relatively stable (Goldberg, n.d.). 
The study covered data from January 2 2004 until December 3 2014; this was 2777 daily 
observations. A 10-year period was considered sufficient to take into account different economic 
cycles that might affect stock and currency markets performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Chart showing Kenyan terrorism fatalities from 1998 – 2013 (Obtained from Global 
Terrorism Database) N/B: The vertical axis represents number of attacks 
 
5.6 Assumptions 
 
The major assumptions made in the study are:- 
i. Terrorist attacks with unknown injuries and fatalities are assumed to have zero injuries 
and fatalities. 
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ii. There is an interest rate parity and lack of arbitrage within the currency market. This is 
justified by Kenya‟s free-floating exchange rate system. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
A multiple regression analysis method with dummy variables will be used for this study. This 
study will mirror the methods used by Eldor & Melnick (2004). 
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6. ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, the results of the research model will be presented in a table format and 
discussed. The coefficient values of the different terror attack variables will also be provided 
along with the levels of significance.    
 
6.2 Discussion of the Findings 
 
Before going through Eldor & Melnick‟s (2004) approach, whereby attacks are looked at 
according to different characteristics, a simple event study can be carried out to determine 
whether terrorist attacks in general have an effect on both Kenya‟s stock and forex market.  
This preliminary analysis was carried out based on 282 terrorist attacks that took place. The 
analysis was first carried out on the stock exchange and then on the exchange rate yield. A mean 
market adjusted analysis method was used. The cumulative average abnormal return was 
calculated over a window period starting from 5 days before the attack until 5 days after the 
attack. The cumulative average abnormal market return (CAAMR) is the sum of the averages of 
the abnormal returns over a period. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8: The behavior of CAAMR for all the events – NSE Yield 
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The results in figure 8 show that the CAAMR decreases post terrorist attack. It sharply declines 
the first day after the attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The behavior of CAAMR for all the events – Exchange Rate Yield 
The shilling is stable before the terrorist attack but depreciates gradually after the attack. The 
impact as can be seen is that terrorist attacks have an adverse impact on the domestic currency. 
As can be seen, terrorist attacks do have an impact on the exchange rate yield. Knowing this, we 
can explore this further by now studying the impacts of different types of attacks on these same 
markets. One key thing to note, is that the for all attacks, t values are close to zero, implying 
there is a high significance  
As per Eldor and Melnick (2004), the model used has four coefficients for observation. (Table 6)  
The first coefficient (γ0) represents the impact of attacks on market returns on the same trading 
day. The second (γ1) and third (γ2) coefficients represent the effects of attacks a day after and 
two days after the attacks took place respectively. The fourth coefficient (γ3) is a combination 
variable of the first three coefficients i.e. the original and the two lagged variables. 
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Interpretation       Co-efficient 
γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 
No Information - - - - 
Transitory Information & Efficient  + + - - 
Permanent Information & Efficient + + - + 
Transitory Information with a lag present + + + - 
Permanent Information with a lag present + + + + 
„+‟ denotes that the coefficient is statistically different from zero while „-‟ denotes that it is not 
 
Table 6: Interpreting the news of a terror attack 
 
 
An attack that has a coefficient statistically different from zero has an impact on the markets. A 
statistically significant γ0 means that the market is efficient in incorporating the news of a new 
attack while statistically significant lagged coefficients mean that there is a delay for the market 
to incorporate the news of an attack. If the combined coefficient γ3 (a combination of the 
variable in question together with a first and second) is statistically different from zero, this 
means that the impact of the attack is permanent. If this coefficient is not statistically different 
from zero, this means that the effects of the attack are transitory in nature and the market will 
revert to its previous state. 
 
 
    Constant MSCI γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R
2
 Sample 
Size 
Attack 
Type 
Assassina
tion 
0.0162 0.1101 −0.2377  −0.0465 −0.0698  −0.1181 0.0111 9 
    0.5125 0.0008  
*** 
0.4228 0.6700 0.5972 0.3114    
  Armed & 
Unarmed 
Assault 
0.0136 0.1103 0.0518 −0.0460 0.0365 0.0139 0.0111 89 
    0.5989 0.0007  
*** 
0.5193 0.5603 0.0365 0.8004    
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  Bombing
/Explosio
n 
0.0103 0.1100 0.0281 0.0232 0.1098 0.0539 0.0113 77 
    0.6890 0.0008  
*** 
0.7247 0.7406 0.1051 0.3268    
  Hijackin
g& 
Hostage 
Taking  
0.0132 0.1100 −0.0908 0.2473 0.1432 0.1052 0.0114 16 
    0.5943 0.0008  
*** 
0.4256 0.1514 0.2181 0.1856    
  Facility/I
nfrastruc
ture 
0.0188 0.1091 −0.7984 −0.1392  −1.6141 −0.8507 0.0160 4 
    0.4344 0.0008    
*** 
0.0000 
*** 
0.8860 0.0016    
*** 
0.0116  
** 
   
  Unknow
n 
0.0155 0.1104 0.0228 −0.0654 −0.2470 −0.0965 0.0110 5 
    0.5279 0.0007  
*** 
0.9465 0.6981 0.3692 0.6473    
Target 
Type 
Business 0.0157 0.1101 −0.0791 0.0761 −0.0592 −0.0219 0.0110 29 
    0.5314 0.0008  
*** 
0.3990 0.6139 0.5666 0.7478    
  Governm
ent  
0.0104 0.1100 0.0056 0.0483 0.0896 0.0478 0.0112 85 
    0.6848 0.0008  
*** 
0.9523 0.5459 0.1995 0.3754    
  Other 0.0130 0.1101 0.1379 0.1486 −0.0265 0.0867 0.0112 20 
    0.6007 0.0008  
*** 
0.3387 0.1447 0.7754 0.2421    
  Private 
Citizens 
0.0151 0.1102 −0.0222 −0.0781 0.0906 −0.0044 0.0111 42 
    0.5477 0.0008  
*** 
0.8250 0.3912 0.3431 0.9478    
  Religious 
Figures/I
nstitution
s 
0.0169 0.1100 0.1707 −0.3640 −0.1775 −0.1289 0.0119 14 
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    0.4931 0.0008  
*** 
0.2148 0.0021  
*** 
0.3752 0.1830    
  Transpor
tation/ 
Commun
ication 
0.0157 0.1104 −0.1810 0.0073 −0.0132 −0.0623 0.0110 10 
    0.5180 0.0007  
*** 
0.3363 0.9823 0.9615 0.7898    
Weapon 
Type 
Firearms 0.0167 0.1102 0.0204 −0.0570 −0.0137 −0.0174 0.0110 90 
    0.5177 0.0007  
*** 
0.7996 0.4456 0.8621 0.7306    
  Explosive
s/Bombs/
Dynamit
e 
0.0061 0.1096 0.0604 0.0493 0.1572 0.0894 0.0120 89 
 
    0.8154 0.0008  
*** 
0.4007 0.4498 0.0266  
** 
0.0774  *    
  Incendia
ry 
0.0189 0.1087 −0.7451  −0.0077 −1.3194 −0.6908 0.0154 5 
    0.4333 0.0008    
*** 
0.0000 
*** 
0.9922 0.0066    
*** 
0.0221  
** 
   
  Melee 0.0152 0.1101 −0.2543 0.0240 0.1519 −0.0261 0.0112 9 
    0.5360 0.0008  
*** 
0.4552 0.9271 0.1759 0.8737    
  Other 0.0151 0.1101  −0.0709 0.1850 −0.1668 −0.0176 0.0110 7 
    0.5393 0.0008  
*** 
0.7771 0.4026 0.4862 0.9197    
Location Cities 0.0147 0.1105 −0.0363 −0.0746 0.1261 0.0039 0.0112 40 
    0.5540 0.0007  
*** 
0.6135 0.4254 0.1929 0.9468    
  Other  0.0125 0.1101 0.0124 0.0243 0.0054 0.0142 0.0109 160 
    0.6419 0.0008  
*** 
0.8473 0.6727 0.9224 0.7155    
Perpetrat
or 
Al-
Shabaab 
0.0118 0.1100 0.0308 0.0157 0.0261 0.0241 0.0110 118 
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    0.6523 0.0008  
*** 
0.6583 0.7908 0.6185 0.5205    
  Other 0.0160 0.1102 −0.0401 −0.0198 0.0275 −0.0110 0.0109 82 
    0.5291 0.0008  
*** 
0.5944 0.8147 0.7523 0.8422    
Fatalities   0.0152 0.1104 0.0102 −0.0058  −0.0056 −0.0007 0.0112 200 
    0.5421 0.0007  
*** 
0.2170 0.6034 0.7360 0.8676    
Injuries   0.0157 0.1103 0.0030 −0.0060 0.0002 −0.0009 0.0111 200 
    0.5291 0.0007  
*** 
0.3876 0.0819  * 0.9534 0.6288    
 
1. The coefficient values are in the 1st row of each category while the P values are in the 2nd row 
2. The coefficients that are highlighted in gray are statistically different from zero. One * represents a 90% confidence 
level, ** represents a 95% confidence level, and *** represents a 99% confidence level. 
3. Key: R2- Adjusted R-Squared, MSCI - Morgan Stanley Capital International Africa Index 
 
Table 7: The impact of terrorist attacks on the Nairobi Securities Exchange 
As was expected, the MSCI Africa ex SA Index returns had a high predictability for the NSE 
returns. It was statistically significant for all the regressions that were run.  
On the day of the attack, attacks on facilities/infrastructure and attacks perpetrated by 
incendiaries led to a decrease in share prices. 
The decrease in the share price is attributable to the decrease in investor panic sales. This 
decrease primarily occurs because of expected increased uncertainty (Markets, 2015). Decreases 
have been observed in various other studies such as Kollas et al (2010), Barros & Gil-Alana 
(2009), Eldor et al (2002) and Gul et al (2010). The immediate response can mainly be attributed 
to uninformed investors who quickly react to the new information. Such investors historically 
even react to non-informative events, as discovered by Lin (2009). 
Attacks on religious figures/institutions and number of people injured led to a decrease of share 
prices on the NSE, a day after the attacks. 
42 
 
Key to note is that most of these attacks took place in the Coastal and North Eastern regions of 
the country. These are areas with a predominantly Muslim population and hence a large number 
of mosques. Some of these mosques have become breeding grounds for radical Muslim 
fundamentalists (Aljazeera.com, 2014b). One major reason for the lag could be due to the trading 
hours on the NSE. The trading hours are from Monday to Friday, 9am to 3pm and many attacks 
take place outside these times (Nairobi Securities Exchange, 2015). These effects may thus be 
felt a day after the attack when the stock market reopens.  
Attacks carried out on facilities/infrastructure and using incendiaries led to a decrease in share 
prices on the NSE while explosives led to an increase in share prices, two days after the attacks. 
An incendiary is a weapon that leads to damage through starting a fire. Most attacks targeted 
private citizens and property and had no casualties. Interesting to note, explosives are the most 
common type of weapon used, this is primarily because the attack can be carried out at a distance 
and thus less likely to kill the perpetrator. Al-Shabaab in particular favors this weapon of attack. 
The two-day delay may be attributed to some investors taking their time to analyze the possible 
impacts of the attacks. These are the informed investors and those who may be waiting for more 
detailed reports on the market from financial analysts. 
As regards stock price appreciation following a terror attack, one possible explanation is due to 
the increase in attractiveness of defense stocks. These are the stocks of companies that provide 
military support, mainly in the form of provision of weapons. For example, following the Paris 
gunmen attack that took place on 13 November 2015, the stocks of companies such as Lockheed 
Martin and General Dynamics increased (The Anti-Media, 2015). 
At a closer look, this however is not the case with the Kenyan stock market since defense 
companies are not listed. The increase may most likely instead be attributed to an avoidance of 
investing in other financial markets that are traditionally viewed as being more volatile. For 
example, forex markets (and money markets in general) have a greater level of perceived 
volatility. This is primarily because the forex market is more influenced by macroeconomic data 
i.e. currencies focus on „the big story‟. This is as compared to the equity markets where the focus 
is mostly on sectors and individual stocks (Marketoracle.co.uk, 2014). Thus, on the day (or a day 
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after) a terror attack, investors may liquidate their money market holdings to finance equity 
purchases. 
Another possible explanation for the appreciation would be that investors hold the view that the 
government will do more in future to combat terrorism. In such situations, investors actually 
increase their portfolios contrary to what would be expected. For example, in France, the CAC 
40 Index
5
 dropped by only 0.08% on the Monday following the attack (USA TODAY, 2016). 
This was peculiar considering the scale of the attack and casualties involved. 
Facility/infrastructure attacks and incendiaries led to a permanent decrease in share prices on the 
NSE. Explosives led to a permanent increase in share prices on the NSE. 
As regards this permanent impact, historically several stock markets may have initial decreases 
that occur but are not long lasting. For example, Nedelescu and John (2005) found that US stock 
markets reversed quickly post 9/11. The NYSE took 13 days to rebound. Interesting, however, is 
that other international markets however took a longer time to rebound, with the Norway and 
Johannesburg stock exchanges taking longer than 100 days. Similarly, according to a study 
carried out by Enders and Sander (n.d.) the Euro Stock Index quickly rebound following the 
Madrid train bombings. 
In this study, we can observe that the variable that represents the permanent effect is positive. 
This however should be taken to mean that the market will take a long time to revert to its mean 
level, and not that it has permanently shifted because of the attack. This is primarily because as 
has already been discussed, other studies (e.g. Nedelescu and John, 2005; Enders and Sander, 
n.d.) have discovered the effects of terrorist attacks are seldom permanent in nature. That being 
said, investors may be overly pessimistic or optimistic at times before realizing the shocks were 
temporary in nature. This could be why the market takes so long to revert to normal. 
 
 
                                                             
5
 This measures the performance of the 40 largest equities listed in France, measured by free-float market-
capitalization and liquidity 
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    Constant IRD γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R
2
 Samp
le 
Size 
 
Attack 
Type 
Assassination 0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0012 0.000
6 
0.0006 0.0008 -
0.001
2 
9  
    0.6592 0.74
18 
0.1959 0.259
6 
0.6189 0.2719     
  Armed & Unarmed 
Assault 
0.0001 0.00
01 
0.0006 0.000
7 
− 0.0018 −0.0001 0.000
8 
89  
    0.6278 0.73
46 
0.2787 0.174
1 
0.3585 0.8212     
  Bombing/Explosion 0.0001 0.00
00 
−0.000
4 
−0.00
04  
0.0008 0.0000 -
0.000
9 
77  
    0.6532 0.73
64 
0.4455 0.467
8 
0.1949 0.9998     
  Hijacking& Hostage 
Taking  
0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0009 0.000
1 
0.0004 0.0004 -
0.001
3 
16  
    0.6697 0.75
09 
0.5834 0.825
4 
0.6618 0.6096     
  Facility/Infrastructur
e 
0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0034 −0.00
59 
−0.0042 −0.0022 0.000
3 
4  
    0.5916 0.72
85 
0.1734 0.232
4 
0.2548 0.3051     
  Unknown 0.0001 0.00
00 
−0.000
5 
−0.00
10 
0.0013 0.0001 -
0.001
3 
5  
    0.6241 0.73
09 
0.2023 0.248
3 
0.1288 0.8437     
Target 
Type 
Business 0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0000 0.000
3 
−0.0004 0.0000 -
0.001
3 
29  
    0.6330 0.73
18 
0.9816 0.591
7 
0.5171 0.9703     
  Government  0.0001 0.00
00 
−0.000
1 
0.000
3 
0.0004 0.0002 -
0.001
2 
85  
    0.7440 0.77
43 
0.8386 0.485
3 
0.5872 0.5493     
  Other 0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0018 0.000
8 
0.0010 0.0012 -
0.000
8 
20  
    0.7522 0.78
35 
0.1785 0.192
4 
0.2571 0.1549     
  Private Citizens 0.0002 0.00
01 
0.0004 −0.00
04 
−0.0027 −0.0009 0.000
7 
42  
45 
 
    0.5293 0.70
22 
0.6713 0.670
2 
0.4882 0.5026     
  Religious 
Figures/Institutions 
0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0005 0.000
1 
0.0006 0.0004 -
0.001
3 
14 
 
 
    0.6553 0.74
00 
0.3988 0.728
4 
0.3926 0.3625     
  Transportation/ 
Communication 
0.0001 0.00
01 
−0.000
6 
−0.00
25 
−0.0025 −0.0019 -
0.000
5 
10  
    0.5562 0.71
99 
0.7480 0.304
6 
0.1251 0.0519  *     
Weapon 
Type 
Firearms 0.0000 0.00
00 
0.0009 0.000
5 
0.0007 0.0007 -
0.000
3 
90  
    0.9475 0.83
96 
0.1256 0.274
2 
0.1142 0.0238  
** 
    
  Explosives/Bombs/Dy
namite 
0.0001 0.00
01 
−0.000
5 
−0.00
03 
0.0003 −0.0002 -
0.001
1 
89 
 
 
    0.5991 0.70
75 
0.3619 0.574
3 
0.6933 0.6728     
  Incendiary 0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0033 −0.00
45 
−0.0047 −0.0020 0.000
4 
5  
    0.5904 0.73
05 
0.1000  
* 
0.275
5 
0.1188 0.2700     
  Melee 0.0002 0.00
00 
−0.000
4 
−0.00
02 
 −0.0178 −0.0061 0.017
4 
9  
    0.4884 0.73
33 
0.5261 0.579
5 
0.2735 0.2443     
  Other 0.0001 0.00
00 
−0.000
6 
−0.00
03 
0.0008 0.0000 -
0.001
3 
7  
    0.6267 0.73
14 
0.1302 0.761
1 
0.2110 0.9820     
Location Cities 0.0002 0.00
01 
−0.000
7 
−0.00
06 
−0.0004 −0.0006 -
0.001
0 
40  
    0.5361 0.69
26 
0.2601 0.469
6 
0.5070 0.1005     
  Other  0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0006 0.000
2 
−0.0005 0.0001 -
0.000
7 
160  
    0.7666 0.78
90 
0.1965 0.538
3 
0.6766 0.7746     
Perpetrato
r 
Al-Shabaab 0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0004 0.000
2 
0.0000 0.0002 -
0.001
2 
118  
46 
 
    0.7640 0.78
87 
0.5410 0.573
3 
0.9752 0.5228     
  Other 0.0002 0.00
01 
0.0001 −0.00
02 
−0.0012  −0.0004 -
0.000
6 
82  
    0.5551 0.71
49 
0.7098 0.782
2 
0.5617 0.5418     
Fatalities   0.0001 0.00
00 
0.0000 0.000
0 
0.0000 0.0000 -
0.001
2 
200  
    0.6775 0.73
99 
0.3795 0.909
7 
0.4878 0.2180     
Injuries   0.0001 0.00
01 
−0.000
1 
0.000
0 
−1.9760
4e-05 
0.0000 -
0.001
0 
200  
    0.5496 0.69
93 
0.0699  
* 
0.473
8 
0.4576 0.0558  *     
 
1. The coefficient values are in the 1st row of each category while P values are in the 2ndrow 
2. The coefficients highlighted in gray are statistically different from zero. One * represents a 90% confidence level, ** 
represents a 95% confidence level, and *** represents a 99% confidence level. 
3.  Key: R2- Adjusted R-Squared, MSCI - Morgan Stanley Capital International Africa Index 
 
Table 8: the impact of terrorist attacks on Kenya’s Forex Markets 
 
The first major observation that can be made is that the Interest Rate differential did not have a 
high predictability for the exchange rate yield. This is consistent with several studies 
(Obstefeldand Rogoff, 2003; Love and Payne, 2008; Thomas, 2012; Khairnar & Chinchwadkar, 
n.d.) that indicate that macroeconomic factors cannot predict foreign exchange rates and that 
market microstructure variables, such as order flows perform better (Evans and Lyons, 2007; 
Love and Payne,2008; Li & Yin, n.d.). Microstructure data for Kenya are unavailable and could 
not therefore be used for this study.  
On the day of the attacks, incendiaries led to a depreciation of the local currency relative to the 
USD while number of people injured led to an appreciation. 
An important observation that can be made is that the effects of terrorist attacks on the forex 
market are not lagged in nature. The effects are typically observed on the day of the attack. This 
is most likely due to the presence of more active day traders in the forex markets as compared to 
the stock market (Dailyfx.com, 2015). Day traders are constantly observing their portfolios and 
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making adjustments as they see fit. The forex market is available 24 hours a day. As for long-
term investors, they tend to ride out fluctuations and are in it for the long term.  (Forexblog.org, 
2007) 
As regards the depreciation, this has been observed in a large number of other studies. These 
include Eldor and Melnick (2004) and Gul et al (2010). As occurs with the stock market, terrorist 
attacks lead to uncertainty and this translates to reduced investment in the local forex market. 
This in turn leads to reduced yields. 
As for the currency appreciation, although this is not the norm, it does occur at times. This can 
be seen in the fact that incendiaries led to an appreciation of the KES. This may occur because 
the fundamentals in support of the KES are so strong that they outweigh the temporary effect of 
an attack. For instance, if the government recently announced an increase in interest rates or a 
trade surplus, or a major discovery of a resource (e.g. viable oil deposits) this would most likely 
lead to an appreciation. Another reason may be that investors anticipate the government will act 
appropriately to tackle the terrorism threat. Investors thus go long on the KES. This is similar in 
case to what happens in the equity markets. As a side note however, this has not been observed 
in other literature. Interesting as well is that this is the opposite of what incendiaries led to in the 
stock market, which had a significant negative yield. 
Attacks on transport and number of people injured had a permanent negative impact on the KES 
while firearms had a permanent positive effect on the KES. Firearms were the second most used 
weapons.  
As was the case with the equity markets, the permanent nature should be taken to mean that the 
market would take longer to revert. Investors may misjudge the impact of the terrorist attacks 
and thus they may take a long time to realize and hence reevaluate their position as required. 
Overall, the results were different from what was initially expected. There were terrorist attacks 
that led to an appreciation of the local currency relative to the USD. Depreciation was the 
expected result because of anticipated reduction in investor appetite for domestic assets. 
In the study by Eldor and Melnick (2004), they observed attacks according to the similar four 
major criteria, these were location, attack type, target type, location and number of people 
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injured and killed. We can thus compare the results that were obtained in that study to those in 
this study. It thus enables the comparison of the impact of attacks in frontier markets (Kenya) to 
emerging markets (Israel). 
Attacks in Haifa had the only significant negative impact on the Israeli Stock Exchange as 
regards location. This was also only on the day of the attack. Attacks on transport and suicide 
attacks had a negative impact a day after the attack. Suicide attacks had additionally had a 
permanent negative impact on the stock market. The number of attacks, number of people killed 
and injured had a negative a day after the attack. There was also a permanent negative impact.  
As for the forex, market attacks in Haifa had a delayed negative impact two days after the attack. 
Those carried out in Tel Aviv led to a depreciation beginning on the day of the attack.  
Attacks on facilities led to a depreciation two days after the attack. Suicide attacks however led 
to depreciation day after the attack and there was a permanent negative impact. Those that were 
carried out using cold weapons
6
 however led to an appreciation two days after the attack.  The 
no. of people killed and injured both led to a permanent appreciation. The number of people 
injured however, a transitory negative impact a day after the attack had. The no. of attacks had a 
transitory impact, two days after the attack.  
The major observation is that all but one significant variable had the expected signs in the Eldor 
and Melnick (2004) paper. Attacks led to a negative return on the stock market and a 
depreciation of the local currency. As has been seen, in the Kenyan markets, this was not the 
case. This may be a sign of inefficiency in both Kenya‟s equity and forex markets. 
Another additional test that was run was the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. The GARCH model assists in studying the effects of 
attacks on the volatility of the financial markets (Quantum Financier, 2010). 
The results showed that terrorist attacks did not lead to an increase in volatility in both financial 
markets (Figures 7 and 8). This is in accordance with the results of the linear regression model 
whereby most terrorist attacks had a limited impact on the markets. This however is in 
                                                             
6 E.g. knives and machetes 
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opposition to other studies that discovered terrorist attacks led to an increase in volatility in 
financial markets (e.g. Arin, Ciferri & Spagnolo, 2008; Kollias et al, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: GARCH test for the NSE 20 Share index Yield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: GARCH test for the Exchange Rate Yield 
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6.3 Summary 
The results showed that facility/infrastructure attacks led to a decrease in share prices on the day 
of the attack and two days after the attack. There was also a permanent negative impact. Attacks 
on religious figures/institutions and number of people injured led to a decrease a day after the 
attack. Incendiaries led to a decrease on the day after the attack. There was also a negative 
impact two days after the attack and after that; there was a permanent negative impact. 
Explosives however led to an increase in share prices on the day after the attack. 
Attacks on transport led to a permanent appreciation of the local currency. Injuries as well also 
had a permanent positive impact on the forex market, this however begun on the day of the 
attack. Firearms as well had a permanent impact; however, this was depreciation instead. 
Incendiaries also led to depreciation but this was only on the day of the attack. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This section will provide a valid conclusion to the study. Also included are recommendations to 
major parties affected by terrorism, the limitations of the study and advice on areas that require 
further research. 
 
7.2 Concluding Remarks 
From the research that was carried out, it was determined that terrorist attacks broadly have an 
impact on Kenya‟s NSE and Forex markets. Different types of attacks led to not only negative 
changes but also surprisingly positive changes, as can be evidenced by reactions of the forex 
market to these events.  
As regards the equity market, attacks that were highly significant were the attacks on 
facilities/infrastructure, religious figures/institutions and attacks carried out using incendiaries. 
These were all significant at a 99% significance level. As for the forex market, firearms had the 
highest significance at a 95% significance level. It can also be seen that the forex market is more 
efficient in incorporating news of a terror attacks as compared to the equity market. This can be 
seen in the fact that the impact of most attacks is felt a day or two after the date of the attack. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
As can be deduced from the research findings, attacks have an impact on the forex and equity 
markets. Investors thus need to be educated on the impact of these attacks on their portfolios so 
that they are able to prepare themselves adequately. This is primarily because terrorist attacks 
seem like a problem that is here to stay. In 2011, 30 attacks occurred, in 2012, 65 attacks took 
place, while in 2013 and 2014 there were 62 and 89 attacks that took place respectively.  
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Asset managers as well should be more prudent and safeguard their client‟s investments to 
ensure there is confidence in the financial markets. This should be done by selecting the right 
assets for their client‟s portfolios. Terrorism insurance covers can also be taken out to cover 
potential losses. Other financial instruments such as futures and options can be utilized. Kenya 
recently launched a derivatives market and this will greatly assist in risk diversification 
(Businessdailyafrica.com, 2015b). One interesting fact to note is that in the international markets, 
many individuals have gone so far as to say that insider trading has been carried out in order to 
profit from terrorism. They say this can be evidenced from the large number of put options 
purchased a few days before the infamous 9/11 attacks (Global Research, 2015). 
The government also needs to avail more resources to fight this problem of terrorism. This will 
lead to more stable financial markets and attract more investment, which will lead to greater 
economic growth within the country.  
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
The first major limitation in this research study was that when two or more attacks take place in 
one day, only the greater attack is considered. This means that even if multiple attacks take 
place, they will simply not be factored into the analysis. This disregards the fact that multiple 
attacks may have a greater impact even if there are a lesser number of combined casualties as 
compared to one major attack. In the study conducted by Eldor and Melnick (2004), the results 
showed that the number of attacks per day had a transitory effect on both the stock and forex 
markets a day and two days after the attack consecutively.   
There were limited samples for some attacks. For example, there were only two attacks that had 
more than 50 fatalities for both fatalities and injuries. There were only four attacks that had more 
than 50 injuries. This may lead to less reliable results. 
Another major limitation is that attacks that took place during the weekends were not considered. 
For example, the second largest attack that has taken place occurred on a weekend. This 
infamous Westgate attack took place on Saturday 21 September 2013. 
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Similarly, attacks occur at different times of the day. The NSE opens at 9am and closes at 3pm. 
Some attacks occur past 3 pm and if there is an impact this will only be represented a day after 
the attack took place. This may lead to a misconception that there is a lag in the stock market 
assimilating the information, which is not the actual case. 
Another major limitation is that major events such as the 2008 post-election violence may skew 
the results. The post-election violence slowed down economic growth to 2-2.5% in 2008 as 
compared to 7.1% in 2007 (En.people.cn, 2016). 
The study also grouped together some categories of attacks for simplicity (Appendix 4). For 
example, government, government (diplomatic), police and military have been grouped together 
under one category as government. 
 
7.5 Further Study 
 
The effects of terrorist attacks on other frontier emerging markets should also be studied. 
Another country that would be a good candidate for a similar study is Nigeria. The country has 
lost nearly 17,000 lives to the infamous terror group Boko Haram that pledges an allegiance to 
ISIS (Amnesty.org, 2015, the Guardian, 2015b). Other potential markets for study include Libya, 
Egypt and Mali. 
Other methodologies can also be utilized to determine the effects of terrorist attacks. This 
includes methods such as an event study methodology. This would add to the robustness of the 
findings.  
Additionally, a longer period of study could be utilized. This would include attacks such as the 
1998 Nairobi US Embassy bomb blast. This is the largest attack that has taken place on Kenyan 
soil. 224 people lost their lives while at least 4000 more were injured (Africaanswerman.com, 
2010). 
The effects of terrorist attacks on other types of financial markets can also be studied. This 
includes spot markets, bond markets, derivative markets and over the counter markets. 
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9. APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 - History of Al-Shabaab 
 
Al-Shabaab was originally formed as the youth group of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).The 
ICU was a system of judicial courts whose main mandate was to bring stability to Somalia. It 
was able to get widespread support and even managed to re-open the Mogadishu International 
Airport
7
, which frequently halted operations due to the ongoing civil war (The Guardian, 2013; 
Cassman, 2015). 
The group however clashed with the transitional Somali government that was backed by 
Ethiopia. Talks were held at Khartoum but no agreement was arrived at. Ethiopia later invaded 
Somalia to help the transitional government retain power. The ICU was defeated and raised the 
white flag but Al-Shabaab continued to operate. It grew over time and as of April 2015, has 
between to be 7000 to 9000 fighters with reports of foreign jihadists joining in from various 
countries across the world (BBC News, 2015f). 
Al-Shabaab still maintains and controls a few towns in Somalia but has lost control of two major 
strategic locations i.e. Mogadishu (the Somalia capital) and the port of Kismayo. This was as 
result of the offensive by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). This was a 
peacekeeping mission launched by the African Union (AU). Al-Shabaab has in recent years 
recruited young Kenyans through luring them with money. Most of the newly recruited come 
from slums in Nairobi where they have no access to jobs (BBC News, 2015g). 
The group is also allegedly recruiting through mosques along the coastal towns of the country. 
This has been made easier by the country‟s extremely porous borders, which has hence 
encouraged the spillover of firearms.  In November 2014, the Kenya Police conducted raids and 
found explosives in two major mosques in Mombasa. Al-Shabaab flags were also discovered 
(Aljazeera.com, 2014b).Foreign fighters are also recruited through the internet. Al-Shabaab has 
accounts on social media sites such as twitter, Facebook and regularly posts propaganda clips to 
video sharing sites such as YouTube. (Ungerleider, 2013) 
 
                                                             
7 Now known as the Aden Adde International Airport 
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Chart showing the distribution of Al-Shabaab attacks between 2011 to 2014 (Obtained from 
Global Terrorism Database) 
 
The fate of Al-Shabaab is unknown. It is however facing a few major challenges. It is lacking 
sufficient funding for its operations since it lost two strategic locations providing a bulk of its 
revenue. These are Mogadishu and Kismayo. Additionally, it is still fighting the AMISOM and 
losing more and more of its territory (AllAfrica.com, 2015). 
On 1 September 2014, its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, died in a US drone strike (BBC News, 
2015b). A successor was appointed but there was sharp opposition from within. The terror group 
is also allegedly considering its allegiance from Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria 
(ISIS), also known as the Islamic State in Iraq & the Levant (ISIL). ISIS is gaining global 
support from other jihadist movements such as Boko Haram in Nigeria (Future, 2015). 
The Kenyan government is facing intense criticism from its citizens. There is little faith in the 
actions that is has taken to curb the attacks. The campaign by the government with the message 
“Security starts with you” was highly criticized (Higgins& Garissa, 2015). The Italian Prime 
Minister, Matteo Renzi, wore a bulletproof vest when he met the president at State House, 
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further highlighting the perception of insecurity (McKenzie, 2015). Obama‟s recent trip to the 
capital also raised a number of security concerns for the country (Starr, 2015).As can be seen in 
the chart below, searches of the key terms terrorism and Kenya have also risen through the years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart showing increase of searches related to ‘Terrorism’ and ‘Kenya’ from 2009 to 
2015(Obtained from Google Trends) 
 
Appendix 2 - History of the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
 
The Nairobi Securities Exchange was launched in 1954 as a voluntary association of brokers. It 
was formed to assist in the development of the local securities market. Up to the time was still an 
over the counter market with no actual trading floors. It was launched as an extension of the 
London stock Exchange since the country was still under the British colonial rule. (Nse.co.ke, 
2015) 
Soon after the country gained independence, the new government tried its best to transfer a level 
of control to the locals. Key to note, the exchange listed a few Ugandan and Tanzanian 
Securities. However, after the collapse of the East African Community, these securities were 
delisted. (Nse.co.ke, 2015) 
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The NSE‟s overseer, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) was founded in 1989 and its main 
mandate was to ensure that there is efficiency within the capital markets. Due to proper 
regulation coupled with attractive investment opportunities in the country, the NSE has become 
one of the most profitable exchanges within the continent (Investing in Africa, 2015).Fast 
forward to the most recent years; the decline of the KES to the USD has favored foreign direct 
investment in the securities exchange. On the other side however, terrorist attacks have set back 
the exchange. This is similar to the Nigerian Stock Exchange that has already registered a -
41.8% dollar adjusted return over the first half of the year (Businessdayonline.com, 2015). This 
decline is because of the terrorist organization Boko Haram.  According to Amnesty 
International, it has killed at least 17,000 people in Northern Nigeria (Amnesty.org, 2015). 
 
Chart showing the 10-year history of the NSE 20 Share Index (Obtained from investing.com) 
 
Table showing the US Dollar-Adjusted Total Return as of July 31, 2015(Obtained from Investing 
in Africa) 
 
STOCK MARKET 1M 1Y 3Y 5Y YTD
S&P500 2.00% 9.00% 52.50% 91.00% 2.20%
BRVM 6.70% 4.20% 88.10% 78.80% 6.80%
Namibian Stock Exchange -0.60% 8.10% 19.90% 66.70% 5.60%
Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange -3.80% -15.40% 31.30% 57.70% -17.40%
Lusaka Stock Exchange -1.00% -23.90% -0.50% 29.80% -20.70%
Nairobi Securities Exchange -12.50% -15.90% 45.30% 25.30% -19.30%
Uganda Securities Exchange -10.60% -19.00% 25.20% 16.10% -19.40%
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange -2.10% -22.70% 9.40% 11.00% -10.70%
Johannesburg Stock Exchange -4.80% -9.90% -3.40% 6.70% -3.90%
Stock Exchange of Mauritius 0.20% -17.40% 0.00% 3.60% -13.60%
Botswana Stock Exchange -0.10% 3.10% 13.60% -0.10% 7.70%
Nigerian Stock Exchange -9.80% -41.80% 5.70% -11.00% -19.70%
Ghana Stock Exchange 6.30% -14.60% 9.20% N/A -18.10%
Malawi Stock Exchange -3.80% 2.40% 58.30% N/A 10.70%
Rwanda Stock Exchange -1.60% -21.70% N/A N/A -13.30%
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Appendix 3 - History of the Foreign Exchange Market 
 
The Kenya Shilling (KES) was first introduced in 1966. This was 2 years after the country 
gained independence on 1 June 1963. It was the successor to the East African Shilling (EAS) that 
had been in use since 1922. The new currency had the portrait of the first president, one of the 
founding fathers of the nation, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. It heralded a new beginning of financial 
independence and prosperity for the country. (Centralbank.go.ke, 2015) 
Fast forward to the last decade, Kenya‟s GDP has been steadily rising and the KES has stayed 
resilient and relatively stable. Between the years of 2003 & 2010, it averaged between KES 74 – 
78 to the US Dollar (Branch, 2011). A year later, the Kenya Shilling slumped to an all-time low 
of 106.75 to the US Dollar. This was primarily due to a huge imbalance of trade. The exports far 
exceeded the imports. The agricultural sector also suffered that year due to unreliable rainfall and 
there was heavy importation of oil-by-oil marketers and technological equipment by 
telecommunication firms. The Kenya government helped to boost domestic food production and 
this assisted in the stabilization of the shilling, if only for a while (Ombok, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart showing the 10-year history of the USD/KES Exchange rate (Obtained from www.xe.com) 
 
The shilling somewhat recovered intermittently, in 2015 however, it shot back to a low of 103 to 
the US Dollar. This was partly driven by the ever-continuing increase in demand of products by 
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the telecommunications and energy sectors. This was also partly due to reduced tourist numbers 
because of travel advisories issued by many Western nations especially after terror attacks. This 
is in response to the terror attacks launched by Al-Shabaab within the country 
(Businessdailyafrica.com, 2015a). 
 
Appendix 4 - Category Groupings 
 
 Grouping Sub-Grouping (If Available) 
Attack Type Assassination   
  Armed & Unarmed Assault Armed Assault, Unarmed Assault 
  Bombing/Explosion   
  Hijacking& Hostage Taking  Hijacking, Hostage Taking - Barricade 
Incident, Hostage Taking - Kidnapping 
  Facility/Infrastructure   
  Unknown   
Weapon Type Firearms   
  Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite   
  Incendiary   
  Melee   
  Other Other, Unknown, Biological 
Target Type  Business    
  Government Government, Police, Military, Government 
(Diplomatic)  
  Other Educational Institution, Others (e.g. 
Refugee camps), Tourists, Terrorists/Non-
State Militia, Unknown, Food or water 
Supply, Journalists and Media, NGO, 
Utilities 
  Private Citizens   
  Religious Figures/Institutions   
  Transportation/Communication Transportation, Airports & Aircraft, 
Maritime, Telecommunication 
Location Cities Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu 
  Other   
Perpetrator Al-Shabaab   
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  Other   
Fatalities N/A   
Injuries N/A   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 – Event Study Additional Data 
 
All Attacks 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0007 0.0012 0.0011 0.0015 0.0020 0.0021 0.0022 0.0025 0.0024 0.0022 0.0021 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 
Standard Deviation 0.0071 0.0115 0.0145 0.0169 0.0188 0.0206 0.0232 0.0251 0.0281 0.0312 0.0341 
T Statistic 0.1003 0.1072 0.0792 0.0866 0.1062 0.1016 0.0953 0.1004 0.0842 0.0701 0.0606 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Assassinations 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0049 0.0050 0.0061 0.0070 0.0094 0.0070 0.0066 0.0059 0.0079 0.0060 0.0062 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 
Standard Deviation 0.0093 0.0116 0.0142 0.0160 0.0181 0.0179 0.0180 0.0206 0.0204 0.0220 0.0206 
T Statistic 0.5282 0.4291 0.4290 0.4414 0.5183 0.3912 0.3646 0.2845 0.3861 0.2745 0.2988 
            Armed and Unarmed Assaults 
         
72 
 
Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0007 0.0013 0.0019 0.0030 0.0034 0.0040 0.0037 0.0041 0.0036 0.0026 0.0013 
Variance 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 
Standard Deviation 0.0073 0.0123 0.0153 0.0184 0.0201 0.0227 0.0253 0.0266 0.0288 0.0317 0.0346 
T Statistic 0.0991 0.1061 0.1252 0.1606 0.1703 0.1775 0.1471 0.1537 0.1242 0.0810 0.0364 
            Bombing & Explosions 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0006 0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0012 0.0013 0.0024 0.0034 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 
Standard Deviation 0.0065 0.0100 0.0132 0.0149 0.0168 0.0185 0.0203 0.0228 0.0255 0.0286 0.0311 
T Statistic 0.0990 0.0892 -0.0366 -0.0716 -0.0328 -0.0100 0.0053 0.0529 0.0508 0.0855 0.1106 
            Hijacking & Hostage Taking 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0004 0.0018 0.0026 0.0029 0.0038 0.0032 0.0057 0.0074 0.0103 0.0107 0.0132 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 
Standard Deviation 0.0050 0.0062 0.0065 0.0071 0.0073 0.0080 0.0113 0.0128 0.0138 0.0168 0.0196 
T Statistic 0.0824 0.2865 0.4007 0.4099 0.5217 0.4010 0.5039 0.5826 0.7472 0.6399 0.6709 
            Facility/Infrastructure 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0045 -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0109 -0.0165 -0.0244 -0.0257 -0.0418 -0.0563 -0.0645 -0.0705 
Variance 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0023 0.0020 0.0033 0.0047 0.0061 
Standard Deviation 0.0127 0.0206 0.0238 0.0248 0.0264 0.0287 0.0475 0.0442 0.0572 0.0682 0.0780 
T Statistic -0.3562 -0.5098 -0.4402 -0.4407 -0.6222 -0.8515 -0.5424 -0.9464 -0.9842 -0.9450 -0.9039 
 
 
 
 
          Unknown Attack 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0006 0.0059 0.0083 0.0088 0.0111 0.0114 0.0107 0.0083 0.0084 0.0105 0.0108 
Variance 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 
Standard Deviation 0.0107 0.0194 0.0258 0.0305 0.0334 0.0282 0.0298 0.0273 0.0263 0.0233 0.0234 
T Statistic -0.0580 0.3035 0.3201 0.2875 0.3341 0.4041 0.3604 0.3025 0.3208 0.4502 0.4616 
            Business 
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Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0022 0.0043 0.0055 0.0051 0.0055 0.0047 0.0054 0.0048 0.0061 0.0081 0.0098 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 
Standard Deviation 0.0055 0.0107 0.0126 0.0183 0.0209 0.0232 0.0245 0.0241 0.0233 0.0260 0.0298 
T Statistic 0.4005 0.4062 0.4382 0.2804 0.2609 0.2011 0.2213 0.1992 0.2596 0.3132 0.3291 
            Government (General) 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0007 0.0011 0.0018 0.0021 0.0022 0.0025 0.0031 0.0040 0.0037 0.0025 0.0022 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 0.0012 
Standard Deviation 0.0073 0.0101 0.0128 0.0155 0.0177 0.0205 0.0227 0.0248 0.0280 0.0308 0.0345 
T Statistic 0.0903 0.1115 0.1379 0.1327 0.1225 0.1205 0.1356 0.1613 0.1313 0.0814 0.0627 
            Other 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0023 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0016 0.0038 0.0042 0.0044 0.0051 0.0059 
Variance 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 
Standard Deviation 0.0072 0.0150 0.0195 0.0227 0.0231 0.0229 0.0264 0.0276 0.0256 0.0252 0.0238 
T Statistic 0.1097 -0.0549 -0.1164 -0.0674 0.0019 0.0694 0.1438 0.1509 0.1716 0.2038 0.2470 
            Private Citizen 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0015 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 0.0010 
Standard Deviation 0.0066 0.0116 0.0149 0.0146 0.0146 0.0145 0.0170 0.0198 0.0245 0.0302 0.0323 
T Statistic -0.0928 0.0554 -0.0887 -0.0821 -0.0131 -0.0309 -0.0705 -0.0164 -0.0740 -0.0360 -0.0477 
  
 
 
 
         Religious Figures/Institutions 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0031 0.0028 0.0040 0.0053 0.0050 0.0065 0.0028 0.0008 0.0016 0.0002 -0.0001 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
Standard Deviation 0.0088 0.0119 0.0154 0.0175 0.0230 0.0255 0.0263 0.0263 0.0282 0.0284 0.0283 
T Statistic 0.3527 0.2365 0.2566 0.3059 0.2171 0.2534 0.1074 0.0308 0.0581 0.0087 -0.0050 
            Transportation/Communication 
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Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013 
Standard Deviation 0.0081 0.0114 0.0138 0.0168 0.0187 0.0216 0.0247 0.0271 0.0302 0.0328 0.0361 
T Statistic 0.0562 0.0567 0.0487 0.0514 0.0240 0.0240 0.0264 0.0422 0.0232 -0.0018 -0.0037 
            Firearms 
             -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0014 0.0018 0.0027 0.0037 0.0037 0.0040 0.0035 0.0034 0.0030 0.0016 0.0003 
Variance 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 
Standard Deviation 0.0075 0.0125 0.0157 0.0183 0.0205 0.0231 0.0253 0.0266 0.0284 0.0306 0.0331 
T Statistic 0.1809 0.1452 0.1738 0.1991 0.1816 0.1720 0.1396 0.1268 0.1048 0.0509 0.0088 
            Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0007 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0011 0.0017 0.0032 0.0039 0.0054 0.0064 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 
Standard Deviation 0.0062 0.0095 0.0121 0.0144 0.0157 0.0171 0.0196 0.0220 0.0248 0.0278 0.0303 
T Statistic 0.1098 0.0988 -0.0029 -0.0138 0.0261 0.0652 0.0852 0.1477 0.1555 0.1926 0.2122 
            Incendiary 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0048 -0.0107 -0.0108 -0.0120 -0.0158 -0.0232 -0.0233 -0.0364 -0.0491 -0.0564 -0.0608 
Variance 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0017 0.0016 0.0027 0.0038 0.0050 
Standard Deviation 0.0111 0.0178 0.0207 0.0216 0.0229 0.0250 0.0415 0.0402 0.0520 0.0618 0.0710 
T Statistic -0.4319 -0.6002 -0.5230 -0.5566 -0.6900 -0.9315 -0.5610 -0.9067 -0.9442 -0.9134 -0.8562 
 
 
 
 
          Melee 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0018 0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0047 0.0022 0.0024 0.0039 0.0048 0.0036 0.0044 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 0.0011 
Standard Deviation 0.0083 0.0082 0.0118 0.0124 0.0136 0.0129 0.0158 0.0178 0.0195 0.0283 0.0333 
T Statistic -0.2153 0.1929 -0.0514 -0.0619 0.3459 0.1683 0.1519 0.2211 0.2485 0.1283 0.1318 
            Other Weapon 
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Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0006 0.0059 0.0083 0.0088 0.0111 0.0114 0.0107 0.0083 0.0084 0.0105 0.0108 
Variance 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 
Standard Deviation 0.0107 0.0194 0.0258 0.0305 0.0334 0.0282 0.0298 0.0273 0.0263 0.0233 0.0234 
T Statistic -0.0580 0.3035 0.3201 0.2875 0.3341 0.4041 0.3604 0.3025 0.3208 0.4502 0.4616 
            Zero Fatalities 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0023 
Variance 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0011 0.0013 
Standard Deviation 0.0065 0.0123 0.0145 0.0162 0.0179 0.0197 0.0220 0.0245 0.0280 0.0327 0.0361 
T Statistic -0.0601 0.0242 -0.0214 0.0053 0.0103 0.0095 0.0256 0.0286 -0.0108 0.0276 0.0642 
            1 - 10 Fatalities 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0015 0.0018 0.0021 0.0021 0.0026 0.0028 0.0028 0.0036 0.0043 0.0034 0.0022 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 
Standard Deviation 0.0075 0.0109 0.0144 0.0173 0.0192 0.0209 0.0239 0.0260 0.0288 0.0312 0.0339 
T Statistic 0.2003 0.1648 0.1430 0.1193 0.1371 0.1350 0.1186 0.1386 0.1494 0.1077 0.0642 
            11 - 50 Fatalities 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0012 0.0030 0.0034 0.0073 0.0116 0.0116 0.0104 0.0062 0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0020 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
Standard Deviation 0.0083 0.0118 0.0156 0.0191 0.0199 0.0257 0.0248 0.0192 0.0133 0.0124 0.0119 
T Statistic 0.1492 0.2516 0.2195 0.3805 0.5846 0.4533 0.4170 0.3219 0.2000 -0.0701 -0.1696 
     
 
 
 
      Zero Injuries 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0004 0.0015 0.0013 0.0021 0.0040 0.0041 0.0045 0.0045 0.0035 0.0024 0.0019 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 
Standard Deviation 0.0069 0.0116 0.0158 0.0179 0.0191 0.0212 0.0233 0.0244 0.0259 0.0280 0.0300 
T Statistic 0.0586 0.1253 0.0821 0.1200 0.2084 0.1951 0.1956 0.1830 0.1341 0.0862 0.0638 
            1 - 10 Injuries 
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Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0011 0.0013 0.0012 0.0014 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012 0.0021 0.0025 0.0029 0.0030 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0015 
Standard Deviation 0.0076 0.0117 0.0137 0.0166 0.0187 0.0206 0.0236 0.0263 0.0307 0.0348 0.0382 
T Statistic 0.1443 0.1148 0.0888 0.0843 0.0550 0.0541 0.0515 0.0784 0.0812 0.0824 0.0797 
            11 - 50 Injuries 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0000 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0080 -0.0086 -0.0108 -0.0116 -0.0088 -0.0056 -0.0052 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 
Standard Deviation 0.0060 0.0074 0.0079 0.0087 0.0119 0.0117 0.0139 0.0157 0.0208 0.0271 0.0336 
T Statistic 0.0081 -0.2085 -0.1484 -0.4768 -0.6701 -0.7387 -0.7785 -0.7367 -0.4207 -0.2073 -0.1544 
            Cities 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0024 -0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0011 0.0003 0.0014 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0013 0.0016 
Standard Deviation 0.0059 0.0102 0.0120 0.0146 0.0177 0.0192 0.0233 0.0267 0.0310 0.0355 0.0401 
T Statistic -0.0740 -0.0597 -0.0779 -0.1368 -0.1145 -0.1248 -0.1301 -0.0709 -0.0367 0.0087 0.0336 
            Other Location 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0010 0.0017 0.0017 0.0023 0.0030 0.0032 0.0035 0.0036 0.0032 0.0027 0.0022 
Variance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 
Standard Deviation 0.0074 0.0117 0.0150 0.0174 0.0189 0.0209 0.0230 0.0246 0.0273 0.0302 0.0326 
T Statistic 0.1356 0.1436 0.1109 0.1337 0.1582 0.1539 0.1525 0.1468 0.1183 0.0880 0.0689 
Al-Shabaab 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0009 0.0013 0.0016 0.0018 0.0021 0.0024 0.0027 0.0030 0.0031 0.0033 0.0037 
Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 
Standard Deviation 0.0066 0.0096 0.0121 0.0145 0.0167 0.0193 0.0215 0.0230 0.0245 0.0252 0.0267 
T Statistic 0.1407 0.1404 0.1356 0.1265 0.1230 0.1254 0.1252 0.1312 0.1249 0.1324 0.1399 
            Other Perpetrator 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0004 0.0011 0.0004 0.0009 0.0019 0.0016 0.0015 0.0018 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0003 
Variance 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011 0.0015 0.0018 
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Standard Deviation 0.0079 0.0138 0.0174 0.0200 0.0214 0.0225 0.0256 0.0280 0.0326 0.0384 0.0426 
T Statistic 0.0528 0.0774 0.0257 0.0474 0.0887 0.0727 0.0600 0.0649 0.0421 0.0146 -0.0069 
 
NSE Yield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Attacks 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0008 0.0012 0.0016 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0038 0.0057 0.0082 0.0089 0.0097 0.0111 0.0119 0.0134 0.0144 0.0156 0.0164 
T Statistic 0.0790 0.0819 0.0437 0.0370 0.0396 0.0452 0.0628 0.0738 0.0570 0.0796 0.0957 
            
Assasinations 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0018 0.0018 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0012 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0006 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Standard Deviation 0.0031 0.0054 0.0057 0.0045 0.0050 0.0067 0.0092 0.0115 0.0089 0.0100 0.0116 
T Statistic 0.5773 0.3227 -0.0025 -0.1626 -0.0457 0.0202 0.1292 0.0188 -0.0783 -0.1564 -0.0555 
            
Armed and Unarmed Assaults 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0002 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0015 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0018 0.0024 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Standard Deviation 0.0040 0.0056 0.0070 0.0070 0.0080 0.0091 0.0098 0.0111 0.0126 0.0142 0.0151 
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T Statistic 0.0608 0.1877 0.1546 0.1369 0.1458 0.1646 0.1816 0.1491 0.1181 0.1267 0.1556 
            
Bombing & Explosions 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0011 0.0007 0.0013 0.0012 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0038 0.0061 0.0095 0.0110 0.0125 0.0141 0.0146 0.0163 0.0173 0.0180 0.0182 
T Statistic 0.1211 0.0331 0.0388 0.0402 0.0087 -0.0134 0.0129 0.0664 0.0422 0.0745 0.0679 
            Hijacking & Hostage Taking 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0026 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0015 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Standard Deviation 0.0031 0.0051 0.0106 0.0059 0.0043 0.0067 0.0078 0.0074 0.0086 0.0085 0.0090 
T Statistic -0.0259 -0.0873 -0.2485 -0.3427 -0.3506 -0.1012 -0.0763 -0.1251 -0.1680 -0.1352 -0.1691 
            Facility/Infrastructure 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0006 -0.0036 -0.0029 -0.0071 -0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0090 -0.0104 -0.0100 -0.0109 -0.0108 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 
Standard Deviation 0.0007 0.0049 0.0043 0.0155 0.0096 0.0097 0.0181 0.0233 0.0207 0.0235 0.0228 
T Statistic -0.8680 -0.7412 -0.6743 -0.4597 -0.4409 -0.4648 -0.4960 -0.4491 -0.4810 -0.4663 -0.4747 
            Unknown Attack 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0015 0.0016 0.0021 0.0041 0.0089 0.0122 0.0164 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 
Standard Deviation 0.0029 0.0027 0.0047 0.0117 0.0105 0.0098 0.0102 0.0098 0.0138 0.0182 0.0248 
T Statistic -0.6955 -0.7631 -0.0116 0.2280 0.1448 0.1588 0.2047 0.4227 0.6423 0.6720 0.6631 
            
Business 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0008 0.0016 0.0009 0.0012 0.0019 0.0017 0.0025 0.0031 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0031 0.0046 0.0055 0.0075 0.0131 0.0146 0.0153 0.0161 0.0160 0.0169 0.0179 
T Statistic 0.0000 0.0637 -0.0017 0.0999 0.1182 0.0607 0.0758 0.1179 0.1064 0.1455 0.1746 
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Government (General) 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0005 0.0012 0.0018 0.0022 0.0022 0.0023 0.0030 0.0035 0.0032 0.0037 0.0040 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0032 0.0061 0.0093 0.0102 0.0109 0.0115 0.0128 0.0148 0.0167 0.0180 0.0183 
T Statistic 0.1676 0.1909 0.1981 0.2158 0.2043 0.1996 0.2334 0.2362 0.1928 0.2053 0.2172 
            
Other 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Standard Deviation 0.0034 0.0048 0.0104 0.0067 0.0055 0.0074 0.0100 0.0102 0.0114 0.0112 0.0115 
T Statistic -0.1008 -0.3475 -0.2501 -0.3547 -0.1876 -0.0086 0.0617 0.0093 0.0282 0.0264 0.0207 
            Private Citizen 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0006 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0016 -0.0011 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
Standard Deviation 0.0056 0.0063 0.0075 0.0079 0.0066 0.0104 0.0080 0.0088 0.0099 0.0121 0.0146 
T Statistic 0.1019 0.1122 0.0099 -0.1128 -0.2823 -0.1486 -0.2404 -0.2125 -0.2212 -0.1300 -0.0735 
            Religious Figures/Institutions 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0000 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Standard Deviation 0.0033 0.0051 0.0047 0.0038 0.0047 0.0057 0.0077 0.0092 0.0083 0.0091 0.0104 
T Statistic 0.0590 -0.0243 -0.3086 -0.5093 -0.3777 -0.2260 -0.1338 -0.1183 -0.1129 -0.0558 -0.0015 
            Transportation/Communication 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0005 0.0012 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0013 0.0010 0.0011 0.0007 0.0009 0.0014 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0024 0.0058 0.0086 0.0107 0.0111 0.0116 0.0127 0.0144 0.0158 0.0168 0.0169 
T Statistic 0.2068 0.2009 0.1619 0.1289 0.1363 0.1111 0.0807 0.0782 0.0466 0.0542 0.0808 
            
Firearms 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
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CAAMR 0.0006 0.0010 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 0.0021 0.0019 0.0017 0.0020 0.0027 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0040 0.0060 0.0083 0.0074 0.0087 0.0098 0.0105 0.0120 0.0133 0.0149 0.0161 
T Statistic 0.1409 0.1635 0.0727 0.0800 0.1274 0.1694 0.1962 0.1608 0.1298 0.1373 0.1647 
            Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 
         Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0035 0.0056 0.0089 0.0101 0.0112 0.0128 0.0134 0.0149 0.0160 0.0165 0.0165 
T Statistic 0.1060 0.0153 0.0139 0.0105 -0.0323 -0.0474 -0.0149 0.0306 0.0061 0.0299 0.0219 
 
 
           
Incendiary 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0029 -0.0040 -0.0036 -0.0062 -0.0034 -0.0043 -0.0099 -0.0101 -0.0083 -0.0089 -0.0087 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
Standard Deviation 0.0051 0.0043 0.0040 0.0136 0.0085 0.0084 0.0159 0.0202 0.0183 0.0208 0.0203 
T Statistic -0.5693 -0.9282 -0.8921 -0.4554 -0.3983 -0.5069 -0.6265 -0.5028 -0.4533 -0.4291 -0.4310 
            Melee 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0000 0.0027 0.0030 0.0025 0.0021 0.0023 0.0024 0.0018 0.0004 0.0014 0.0018 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Standard Deviation 0.0029 0.0042 0.0053 0.0060 0.0056 0.0058 0.0069 0.0069 0.0060 0.0067 0.0075 
T Statistic 0.0054 0.6548 0.5655 0.4151 0.3664 0.3950 0.3455 0.2553 0.0594 0.2120 0.2412 
            Other Weapon 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0015 0.0016 0.0021 0.0041 0.0089 0.0122 0.0164 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 
Standard Deviation 0.0029 0.0027 0.0047 0.0117 0.0105 0.0098 0.0102 0.0098 0.0138 0.0182 0.0248 
T Statistic -0.6955 -0.7631 -0.0116 0.2280 0.1448 0.1588 0.2047 0.4227 0.6423 0.6720 0.6631 
            Zero Fatalities 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 0.0003 0.0006 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011 0.0007 
81 
 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0034 0.0058 0.0093 0.0092 0.0111 0.0128 0.0142 0.0157 0.0167 0.0187 0.0187 
T Statistic 0.0400 0.0308 0.0186 0.0210 0.0614 0.0265 0.0418 0.0589 0.0473 0.0601 0.0390 
            1 - 10 Fatalities 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007 0.0011 0.0012 0.0010 0.0015 0.0024 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Standard Deviation 0.0040 0.0058 0.0077 0.0090 0.0089 0.0100 0.0103 0.0118 0.0131 0.0136 0.0151 
T Statistic 0.1273 0.1222 0.0660 0.0562 0.0253 0.0692 0.1031 0.1051 0.0747 0.1122 0.1599 
            11 - 50 Fatalities 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0009 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0015 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard Deviation 0.0048 0.0033 0.0042 0.0035 0.0043 0.0049 0.0065 0.0053 0.0044 0.0059 0.0062 
T Statistic -0.1958 0.0344 0.0550 -0.2040 -0.1063 -0.1102 -0.3068 -0.3724 -0.2339 -0.2361 -0.2466 
            
Zero Injuries 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 0.0006 0.0010 0.0011 0.0009 0.0017 0.0021 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0041 0.0058 0.0081 0.0078 0.0079 0.0097 0.0101 0.0116 0.0137 0.0150 0.0165 
T Statistic -0.0237 0.0304 -0.0239 0.0276 0.0922 0.0655 0.0977 0.0961 0.0678 0.1137 0.1297 
            1 - 10 Injuries 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0010 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0033 0.0056 0.0082 0.0099 0.0114 0.0125 0.0136 0.0151 0.0154 0.0167 0.0168 
T Statistic 0.1556 0.0995 0.0716 0.0277 0.0085 0.0380 0.0517 0.0525 0.0442 0.0422 0.0577 
            11 - 50 Injuries 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0022 0.0028 0.0041 0.0025 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0027 0.0023 0.0031 0.0033 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
Standard Deviation 0.0048 0.0060 0.0106 0.0087 0.0089 0.0102 0.0116 0.0124 0.0129 0.0116 0.0125 
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T Statistic 0.4616 0.4576 0.3922 0.2892 0.0509 0.0225 -0.0222 0.2179 0.1815 0.2723 0.2622 
            
Cities 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0025 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Standard Deviation 0.0027 0.0041 0.0046 0.0067 0.0059 0.0063 0.0090 0.0106 0.0100 0.0108 0.0114 
T Statistic 0.1836 0.0049 -0.1135 -0.1879 -0.2620 -0.3432 -0.2676 -0.2245 -0.2866 -0.2644 -0.2183 
            Other Location 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0015 0.0018 0.0017 0.0023 0.0026 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0040 0.0060 0.0089 0.0093 0.0104 0.0119 0.0124 0.0139 0.0152 0.0165 0.0173 
T Statistic 0.0626 0.0958 0.0650 0.0773 0.0831 0.0977 0.1230 0.1315 0.1140 0.1373 0.1488 
            Al-Shabaab 
           Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 0.0015 0.0021 0.0019 0.0022 0.0022 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
Standard Deviation 0.0032 0.0054 0.0087 0.0092 0.0109 0.0119 0.0128 0.0140 0.0150 0.0161 0.0169 
T Statistic 0.0595 0.0631 0.0702 0.0953 0.1008 0.0959 0.1140 0.1473 0.1272 0.1357 0.1321 
            Other Perpetrator 
          Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
CAAMR 0.0004 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0006 
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Standard Deviation 0.0045 0.0061 0.0077 0.0085 0.0077 0.0097 0.0105 0.0123 0.0135 0.0149 0.0157 
T Statistic 0.1008 0.1057 0.0013 -0.0521 -0.0829 -0.0428 -0.0249 -0.0440 -0.0538 -0.0067 0.0400 
Exchange Rate Yield 
 
